Serge Narkevich, Author at strategic foundation Thu, 09 Nov 2023 04:02:32 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://strategic.foundation/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/fav_found-150x150.png Serge Narkevich, Author at strategic foundation 32 32 OPEC+ Recent Actions Timeline https://strategic.foundation/opec-recent-actions-timeline/ Tue, 10 Aug 2021 17:46:18 +0000 https://strategic.foundation/?p=59 In a recent article on OPEC+ (available here) I went through the Saudi Arabia’s actions during the recent COVID-19 crisis. Just in order to be precise in how events unfolded, which may be interesting and valuable for some readers, here is a detailed timeline of events. Events prior to mid-2019: when oil prices stabilized in […]

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In a recent article on OPEC+ (available here) I went through the Saudi Arabia’s actions during the recent COVID-19 crisis. Just in order to be precise in how events unfolded, which may be interesting and valuable for some readers, here is a detailed timeline of events.

Events prior to mid-2019:

  • when oil prices stabilized in mid-2017 they were deviating in the comfortable level of $60-80 per barrel till the end of 2018;
  • after prices went down sharply an OPEC+ ministerial meeting was convened in December 2018 – it was decided that there will be voluntarily curbs to production with OPEC reducing output by 0.8 million barrels per day (mbpd) and non-OPEC participants by 0.4 mbpd (see);
  • OPEC+ mostly adhered to the plan and re-iterated their commitment in March 2019 (see) and July 2019 (see).

September 2019 – Taking One for the Team:

  • after a short rebound prices started to go down again so a further reduction of output – in the form of significantly overdoing the curbs accepted December 2019 – was agreed upon in August 2019 (see);
  • it was Saudi Arabia’s bold decision to reduce production single-handedly by 1.35 mbpd in September while virtually all the other participating nations maintained output unchanged or almost unchanged;
  • prices stabilized and went up until the end-2019 so production resumed;
  • in December 2019 expecting an unstable market in the future due to the evolving COVID-19 pandemic OPEC+ agreed to a further – to the figures agreed in December 2018 – 0.5 mbpd reduction in output to be split among all member plus an additional 0.4 mbpd reduction by several countries but Saudi Arabia mostly.

March 2020 – The Price War and Its Aftermath:

  • the market started to look extremely fragile in the end-2019 as the COVID-19 pandemic started swaying major world economies and prices went down in early 2020;
  • the emergency meeting in early March recommended OPEC+ a reduction additional to previously agreed cuts of 1.0 mbpd by OPEC and 0.5 mbpd by non-OPEC;
  • however, this time Russia did not manage to find an agreement on further production cuts (see and see )
  • in response instead of all the earlier accepted cuts Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE increased their production by nearly 2.35 mbpd (0.25, 1.8, 0.3) instantly;
  • prices plummeted to the levels last seen in early 2000s;
  • talks between Saudi Arabia and Russia resumed shortly: in April 2020 a comprehensive cuts package was agreed upon with main takeaways being the following (see for preliminary agreement and see for final agreement):
    • all OPEC+ members base production was considered to be equal to the levels of October 2019, except for Saudi Arabia which got its base output level increased from 9.9 to 11.0 mbpd and Russia which got its base output level lowered from 11.5 to 11.0 mbpd;
    • for 1st two months a total decrease of 9.7 mbpd was agreed upon;
    • for the period July-December 2020 a reduction of 7.7 mbpd was accepted ;
    • 5.8 mbpd adjustment for a period of 16 months, from 1 January 2021 to 30 April 2022;
  • additional output reduction from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Oman equal to about 1.2 mbpd in June;
  • it was agreed that countries that were not adhering to the earlier quotas need to compensate a for previously overproduced volumes, e.g. Kazakhstan to compensate about 0.7 mbpd (see).

January 2021 – Playing Along Again?

  • from January 2021 participating countries decided to adjust production by 0.5 mbpd from 7.7 mbpd to 7.2 mbpd;
  • in March 2021 an exception was made for Russia and Kazakhstan, which were allowed to increase production insignificantly, in order to balance seasonal consumption;
  • at the same time UAE complained that its reduction in output was unfair and cited the need to start making work the investments made in the last years in increasing its production capacity;
  • initially Saudi Arabia declined the UAE’s request trying to keep the recently reached cartel’s cohesion but later UAE’s reference production level was increased by 0.3 mbpd starting in May 2022, at the same time Saudi Arabia’s and Russia’s baseline production was also increased by 0.5 mbpd, and Iraq and Kuwait got 0.15 increases both;
  • starting August 2021 overall production is to be increased by 0.4 mbpd monthly until the curbs that are still in place are phased out (the current output cuts of 5.8 mbpd expected to be phased out by late 2022), in December 2021 market developments to be assessed again.

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Recent Events in the World Oil Market https://strategic.foundation/recent-events-in-the-world-oil-market/ Tue, 10 Aug 2021 17:32:03 +0000 https://strategic.foundation/?p=47 The last two years have seen turmoil in many economic areas but the world crude oil market has been particularly hit. In terms of strategy there was a particular extremely fascinating development that influenced many other events. It was the new stance demonstrated by the key player – Saudi Arabia – and its several close […]

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The last two years have seen turmoil in many economic areas but the world crude oil market has been particularly hit. In terms of strategy there was a particular extremely fascinating development that influenced many other events. It was the new stance demonstrated by the key player – Saudi Arabia – and its several close allies. Saudi Arabia’s production strategy changed at least three times, which is quite unusual for such a short period of time. Moreover, it was really stunning to see this frequent attitude change from a producer widely considered the steadying force of the market.

So what engendered such behavior? Why would the bulwark of stability depart from its predictable approach?

Episode 1: Taking One for the Team

The recent tumultuous episode started in mid-2019 with a fall in prices and collective action by OPEC+ to deal with this fall. It can be seen in the charts below that Saudi Arabia significantly reduced its crude production while the other key players kept theirs intact.

Basically, Saudi Arabia agreed to take the hit virtually alone in order to stabilize the market and keep the nascent OPEC+ alive and running. This lone action was enough to keep the oil price from falling further, and by the end of 2019 prices started growing again.

Episode 2: The Price War and Its Aftermath

The situation changed drastically in early 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic became a real and acute threat to the health of the world economy. People and businesses were coming under the lockdowns all over the world. As a result, the demand for most commodities, and most notably oil, was evaporating quickly.

The advised solution was quite straightforward: reduce output and do it rapidly. Nevertheless, some participants of the OPEC+ could not be persuaded. Even before it had been discussed for months that Russia was free-riding the cartel’s previous agreements to limit production. In March 2020 it became evident that Russia did not want to abide by the proposed new reduction action.

This was when Saudi Arabia’s strategy changed radically and decisively. The price war was started. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) virtually overnight expanded production by 2.35 million barrels per day (mbpd) on a falling market. Oil prices plummeted. Traders panicked. In some cases to avoid actual delivery, they were ready to pay others to get rid of that crude in tankers moving to the port. These were the days when even the general public learned that oil prices can be negative.

Emotions ran high at the time but Saudi Arabia’s confrontational strategy worked. OPEC+ convened an emergency meeting and agreed to substantial production cuts. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s normal level of production (the one from which curbs are calculated) was increased from 9 mbpd to 11 mbpd, while Russia’s was lowered. Conformity levels (the term used by OPEC to describe abiding by the agreed levels of output) improved. Subsequently, world oil production went down, prices stabilized and later rebounded.

Episode 3: Playing along Again?

The most recent transformation in Saudi Arabia’s strategy can be seen in the last several months. After OPEC+ returned back to collaboration and adhering to the promised output levels, the unity in the cartel seemed restored.

And yet some frictions still arise. For example, just in July 2021 Kuwait did not want to agree to the earlier set pace of exiting from the production cuts. They wanted to produce more. Talks ensued. It was agreed that Kuwait would get what it wanted.

But at the same time other countries with spare capacity – Russia and Saudi Arabia – got their base production levels increased. The easy-to-miss nuance in this decision: Saudi Arabia can play along with your demands but now they want their part of the deal and their share of the market on the other part of the scale.

Note 1: OPEC and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) use different definitions of oil production. Most notably EIA includes condensate in non-OPEC oil production. More discussion on the differences can be found here and here.

Note 2: Here in order to avoid complications the EIA’s forecast for production and prices is presented.

Note 3: OPEC 10 are Algeria, Angola, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, UAE. Non-OPEC members of OPEC+ are Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Russia, Sudan, South Sudan.

Note 4: Data for the oil production of the non-OPEC participants of the OPEC+ presented here does not include output of Bahrain (baseline production 0.2 mbpd), Brunei (0.1 mbpd), and Sudan (less than 0.1 mbpd).

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